First, we can say, “John Smith is a legal person.” In this case, there is a non-legal person (John Smith) that has an attribute related to a legal system. What constitutes the legal personality of John Smith is his possession of claims and encumbrances which constitute the incidents of a legal person. In this sense, it is quite natural to say that someone becomes a legal person, as when a slave is freed. However, the term “legal person” is also used in another sense and refers to a specific type of charges and claims. For example, a lawyer may say to his client, “We can create a trust or a legal entity to manage these assets.” It is unlikely that the lawyer would suggest that someone or something would become a legal entity if the client chooses the latter alternative. Rather, it is a legal regulation that does not necessarily change anyone`s personality status; For example, the new “corporation” may be controlled directly by the lawyer who is already a corporation. Generally, a legal person can sue and be sued, own property and enter into contracts. I use “legal platform” in a fixed sense. Being a legal entity is an attribute of a non-legal entity conferred by an effective legal system.
This is similar to the status of a piece of fiber as money in any jurisdiction. A legal platform, on the other hand, is a specific set of legal claims and charges. Legal platforms only exist in law and can be connected to certain types of businesses. According to Indian law, “shebaitship” is the property belonging to the deity or idol as a “legal person”. People who are destined to act in the name of divinity are called “shebait”. A shebait acts as guardian or guardian of the deity to protect the right of the deity and fulfill the legal duties of the deity. Shebait is similar to a trustee if the deity or temple has a legally registered trust or legal entity. According to Hindu law, goods given or offered as rituals or gifts, etc.
absolutely belong to the deity and not to the shebait. The case studies are “Profulla Chrone Requitte vs Satya Chorone Requitte”, AIR 1979 SC 1682 (1686): (1979) 3 SCC 409: (1979) 3 SCR 431. (ii)” and “Shambhu Charan Shukla vs Thakur Ladli Radha Chandra Madan Gopalji Maharaj, AIR 1985 SC 905 (909): (1985) 2 SCC 524: (1985) 3 SCR 372”. [24] Partly on the basis of the principle that corporations are simply organizations of individuals, and in part on the basis of the history of the legal interpretation of the word “person,” the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that certain constitutional rights protect corporations (such as corporations and other organizations). Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad is sometimes cited for this statement because the court reporter`s comments included a statement by the Chief Justice made before the hearing began, telling counsel during pre-trial preparation that “the court does not wish to hear arguments as to whether the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits a State from denying equal protection of the law to any person within its jurisdiction applies to such corporations. We all agree that this is the case. To regard legal personality as something distinct from legal relations is to make a mistake of the same kind as to distinguish title from rights, powers, privileges and immunities for which it is only a broad name.
Without the parents, in both cases, all that`s left is the smile of the Cheshire cat after the cat leaves.6 Lawson points out that, at least in theory, a business lawyer can start an unlimited number of businesses to meet the needs of a business. Lawson, however, is well aware that we are not talking here about “physical things,” but about “abstract entities that can function as subjects and objects of legal relations”.”14 Let us first leave aside the untenable assertion that to be a legal person is to be a subject and object of legal relations; The important point here is that the incorporation of a company does not necessarily imply the transfer of legal personality to an already existing entity. On the contrary, a new institutional fact is simply emerging. This is analogous to the two ways in which money can exist, as John Searle noted.15 The most traditional type of money is silver.16 In this case, a physical object (usually a piece of metal or paper) is silver. When a coin is melted down to make a ball, it is no longer money; Its status as money disappears, and there is less money in the world. Let`s call it physical money. Not all money exists in this form today. Most instances of money do not correspond to any particular physical object – they are autonomous, to use Searle`s term.17 This type of money exists only in the form of information that can be stored by various methods (human memory, paper, hard drives, etc.). 18 Let`s call it abstract money. With regard to the ritual requirement that whoever “takes” the lulav and etrog on the holiday of Sukkot must have a title in order to properly fulfill the commandment, an interesting discussion has arisen in religious kibbutzim circles in Israel as to whether and to what extent kibbutzim constitute a legal person and what status they have in the eyes of traditional Jewish law (cf. A.
Nachlon, in: Ammudim (Ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati, 1956), Nr. 123, 124; (1957), Nos. 126, 128). Perhaps a little detour through trust law can shed more light on this subject. Trusts are common law legal instruments that do not exist in most civil jurisdictions. Simply put, a trust in its primary form involves the allocation of defined assets to a trustee who holds title to the assets, but is expected to manage the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Opinions differ as to whether the beneficiary`s position is to be understood as “beneficial ownership” of the property – which includes cases of passive ownership – or whether the trustee and beneficiary have a relationship covered by the law of obligations.21 In Scotland, a mixed court, a theoretical solution has been developed. Some Scottish jurists apply the so-called double inheritance theory to trusts.22 “Estate”, also known as “estate”, here refers to an agreement used in some civil and mixed jurisdictions.
An inheritance is essentially the totality of a person`s claims and burdens that can be said to have monetary value, such as financial assets and liabilities.23 Generally, any property of an inheritance can be used to cover the debts of the same inheritance, while the assets of heir A are secured against debts related to heir B. Now, Kenneth Reid argues that the “general inheritance” of a trustee and his “guardianship” are separate in Scottish fiduciary law: we can, of course, ask why we cannot treat rivers and other natural objects as legal actors. Richard Tur envisions a scenario in which it is determined that the rise of a river to a certain level represents the acceptance of an offer by the local community, who would then be forced to make a payment of x goats to the river. Thus, the river would have done an act – in fact, an act in law. The main question of whether to treat a company as an active legal entity boils down to whether we can adopt a deliberate attitude towards the company. I have already presented Daniel Dennett`s account of intentional attitude in chapter 2.57. According to Dennett, intentional behavior is one of three strategies that can be used to predict an entity`s behavior.58 More generally, I argue that passive legal personality operates primarily through rights of law. Some characteristics of the passive legal entity may also include responsibilities (such as the ability to suffer legal harm) and freedoms (which are then guaranteed by basic safeguards). However, claims are by far the most important elements of Hohfeld`s passive legal personality for three reasons. First, the mere possession of freedoms cannot be described as passive legal personality.